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ESSAYS IN HONOR OF W. S. KARUNATILLAKE

Edited by

Carol S. Anderson, Kalamazoo College

Susanne Mrozik, Mount Holyoke College

R. M. W. Rajapakse, University of Kelaniya

W. M. Wijeratne, University of Kelaniya



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
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Dedicated  
With the deepest respect  
to

*W.S. Karunatilake*

## 9. Shame and Apprehension: Notes on the Moral Value of Hiri and Ottappa

*Maria Heim*

**D**ESPITE AMPLE RESOURCES in the Buddhist literatures in the area of moral psychology, modern scholars have not fully appreciated the importance of the moral sentiments for the study of Buddhist ethics. This essay offers a preliminary account, drawn from the Pāli sources, of a set of moral sentiments that concern the affective faculties of self-awareness. In particular, I am interested here in certain emotions of self-appraisal wherein one becomes aware of one's capacity for wrongdoing. While the English words *shame*, *guilt*, and *remorse* cover some of this territory, the Pāli tradition has different ways of parsing the affective dimensions of self-evaluation that can add to our understanding of Buddhist ethics and begin to reframe some of the ways in which Western philosophical and psychological literatures have treated this arena of human experience. This account begins with and centers on the experiences of *hiri* and *ottappa*.

*Hiri* has been variously translated as moral shame, conscience, self-respect, and modesty, and *ottappa* as moral dread, shame, consciousness, and fear of evil.<sup>1</sup> The words are almost always used together.<sup>2</sup> While both terms are suggestive of aspects or components of the English concept of conscience, they have distinct connotations that benefit from closer scrutiny. To possess *hiri* involves a feeling of "being

ashamed of misconduct in body, speech, and mind, being ashamed of engaging in what is evil and unwholesome."<sup>3</sup> The experience of *ottappa* entails "shrinking in fear" (*ottappati*) from wrongdoing. *Ottappa* is being "afraid of misconduct in body, speech, and mind, afraid of engaging in what is evil and unwholesome."<sup>4</sup> Buddhaghosa defines them thus:

*Hiri* is being ashamed because of bad physical actions and so on. It is the official term for shame. *Ottappa* is having fear because of these also. It is the official term for anguish about evil. There, *hiri* has the characteristic of disgust. *Ottappa* has the characteristic of fear. *Hiri* has the function of not causing evil because of the condition of shame, *ottappa* because of the condition of fear. They are manifested in shrinking from evil in the manner already described: their proximate causes are respect for self and respect for others. Having respect for oneself one resists evil because of *hiri*, like the daughter of a good family. Having respect for others means one resists evil because of *ottappa*, like a prostitute. And so these two states should be regarded as the guardians of the world.<sup>5</sup>

The commentary expands on the characteristics of these terms: *hiri* is characterized by disgust, for "one is disgusted by evil things just as when one sees excrement"; *ottappa* is "characterized by fear of evil just as when one sees something burning."<sup>6</sup> Also notable here is the distinction made between the two in that *hiri* arises from self-respect, suggesting an inner standard one sets for oneself. *Ottappa*, on the other hand, is generated out of fear of external reprisal, as when a prostitute might desist from her trade due to respect (in the sense of fear) for some external threat. The commentary provides some nuance, however, by suggesting that there is no complete separation between them, because shame is not free of fear, nor is fear of evil free of shame.<sup>7</sup>

Both *hiri* and *ottappa* are said to be present in every wholesome state of consciousness. They must be present for virtue to arise: "when *hiri* and *ottappa* are present virtue arises and persists, and when they are absent, it neither arises nor persists."<sup>8</sup> In the Abhidhamma, they

are listed among the "universal beautiful factors" (*sobhanābhāvanā-cetasika*) that occur in all beautiful consciousnesses.<sup>9</sup> They are also included in the list of seven powers or strengths (*bala*) of the Abhidhamma.<sup>10</sup> The sense of power or strength here suggests firmness (*akampiya*) in the face of their opposites, fortifying the other aspects of spiritual development as well; according to Nyanaponika, "if their roots go deep enough in the character of the individual, they will automatically set up spontaneous reactions of restraint and curb all evil influences."<sup>11</sup> One who lacks the strengths "lives in this world suffering, vexed, agitated, and fevered" and can anticipate an unfortunate rebirth; conversely, possessing them, "one lives happily, at ease, unflustered, and cool," anticipating a fortunate birth.<sup>12</sup> Their presence makes control of the senses possible.<sup>13</sup>

But how does one acquire them? The *Athasālini* provides perhaps the most exhaustive and subtle discussion of the strengths and how to generate them. *Hiri*, said to result from an internal sense, is analyzed as coming from four causes. Considering one's birth, age, courage, and learning, one reflects: "Because it is harmful, this act is not for the well-born, it is an act of low-caste people such as fishermen, and so it is not fitting for the well-born to do such an act." Thus while considering one's birth, one does not do harm such as taking life, and so one generates *hiri*. Likewise, "This harmful act should be done only by boys; it is not fitting for one of my age to do this act." Thus considering one's age, one does not do harm such as taking life and so generates *hiri*. Likewise, "This harmful act is that of cowards, and it is not fitting that one possessing courage should do this act." Thus considering one's courage, one does not do harm such as taking life and so generates *hiri*. Likewise, "This harmful act is an act of blind fools not the wise, and it is not fitting for the learned and wise to do this act." Thus considering one's learning, one does not do harm such as taking life and so generates *hiri*.<sup>14</sup>

Here one carefully considers an act in reference to one's social standing and the standards one sets for oneself. One is keenly attuned to external criteria valued by the world and measures oneself against them. The term *hiri* is also characterized by a sense of respect or deference. One internalizes high standards and they become the source

of an inner voice: "considering the greatness of his birth, his teachers, his inheritance, and his fellow cellmates," a monk desists from evil acts by generating *hiri*, which is characterized by deference.<sup>15</sup>

The experience of *ottappa* is different in that it is sensitive to blame from others and is in that sense externally generated. One considers that "if I do an evil act I will be blamed by the four assemblies" (i.e., brahmins, nobility, householders, and mendicants); it is the fear of being rejected, as filth is shunned by sophisticated people.<sup>16</sup> Here anguish at the prospects of public censure and ostracism proves to be a powerful deterrent. Where *hiri* is being "ruled by the self" (*attāhipati*), *ottappa* entails that one is, literally, "ruled by the world" (*lokāhipati*):

How is *ottappa* [understood as] ruled by the world? Here a certain son of a good family places the world foremost as his ruler and does not do a harmful act. As [the Buddha] said: "Large indeed is human society, and in human society on the great earth are recluses and brahmins with supernatural powers and clairvoyance and who can read minds; and they can see from afar, or even when near, may not be visible, and by their minds they know one's thoughts, and so they will know me in this way: 'look at this son of a good family, a homeless monk who left home with faith, and now lives mixed up in evil and unwholesome things.'"<sup>17</sup>

In this experience one becomes aware of oneself as part of a larger community of people who may come to know, even in unexpected ways, what one is up to. One fears being seen by them doing wrong and is thus governed by this fear of their accusing gaze, even if it is only an imagined gaze.

The importance of sight and the worry about being seen in a compromising position is evident in both *hiri* and *ottappa* as these examples show. *Hiri* conveys a sense in which one, out of self-respect, does not want to see oneself behave badly. *Ottappa* is a more visceral fear of the opprobrium of one's fellows who can gaze at one from afar. Bernard Williams has suggested that "the most primitive experiences of shame are connected with sight and being seen"; in shame, one

wishes to disappear, "to sink through the floor."<sup>18</sup> Evident as well in the Pāli examples is Williams' observation that one does not need to *actually* be seen for shame to occur and that "for many of its operations the imagined gaze of an imagined other will do."<sup>19</sup> In both *hiri* and *ottappa* one looks at oneself through the eyes of an imagined other and evaluates what one sees.<sup>20</sup>

Moreover, and again in line with Williams, it is not the gaze (imagined or not) of just any others that one is aware of, but of admired others. The Pāli sources are particularly sensitive to the impact of the monastic community on a monk's self-appraisal. In describing the meditation practice of recollections of the *sangha*, the *Vissuddhimagga* states that one of the benefits of this practice is the development of *hiri* and *ottappa*: with the *sangha* present in one's mind "when he has an opportunity for transgression he brings up *hiri* and *ottappa* as though he were seeing, face-to-face, the *sangha* itself."<sup>21</sup> Here the other before whom one assesses the self is a quite abstract and idealized collective; nevertheless one is brought into a place of shame through imagining oneself in face-to-face contact with it.

Thus, *hiri* and *ottappa* are feelings one experiences about oneself through one's awareness of certain others. The presence of the Buddha or the *sangha* in peoples' lives is often said to kindle *hiri* and *ottappa*.<sup>22</sup> In one place the Buddha exhorts Mahākassapa to practice by saying to himself: "I will arouse a keen sense of *hiri* and *ottappa* toward elders, novices, and those of middle rank."<sup>23</sup> The *Dīgha Nikāya* instructs that there are several conditions conducive to seeking wisdom and the holy life; the first is living close to one's teacher and thereby becoming strong in *hiri* and *ottappa*, and in affection and respect.<sup>24</sup> These are cultivated in living in close intimacy to one's teacher. This idea of being in association with people one admires as integral to the religious and moral path is a common theme in the Pāli sources. For example, Ānanda once stated that "half the holy life is friendship with good people, companionship with good people, intimacy with good people" only to be immediately corrected by the Buddha: "Nor so, Ānanda! Nor so, Ānanda! This is the entire holy life."<sup>25</sup> Being in the company of good people is the *whole* of the religious life. *Hiri* and *ottappa* help us to

glimpse the weight assigned to sociality in the Theravāda and the ways in which the development of one's moral life is conditioned by others.

The sense of fear and apprehension in descriptions of *otappa* is palpable. Not only does one fear accusation, but one fears the consequences of one's evil-doing in punishment and future bad births. Where *hiri* prevents one from doing harm because of fear of being contaminated by something unworthy of oneself, *otappa* is fear of karmic retribution in hell. The *Atthasālinī* offers an illustration:

If there were two iron balls, one cool but smeared with excrement and the other hot and on fire, the wise would not touch the cool one because of being disgusted by the smearing of excrement, and the other one because of fear of being burned. It should be understood that desisting from evil, having developed an internal state of shame, is like not touching the cool one due to disgust for the smearing of excrement, and desisting from evil out of fear of hell is like not touching the hot one because of fear of being burned.<sup>26</sup>

The graphic aspects of the experiences conveyed in this illustration are significant. *Hiri* is again likened to disgust, which can be a significant aspect of shame. *Otappa* is self-preservation from fear about future harm to oneself resulting from one's acts.

In addition to their placement among the strengths, *hiri* and *otappa* are given further mention in the list of wholesome states in Abhidhamma as the two "guardians of the world" (*lokapālas*), for they protect the world from us.<sup>27</sup> These "two bright states" are internal structures that keep us in check and rein in our damage to the world. In particular, they keep us from the sexual confusion of barnyard animals: "Monks, if these two bright states did not protect the world, there would be seen no mother, mother's sister, uncle's wife, teacher's wife, wives of honorable men, and instead the world would come to confusion such as exists among goats and sheep, chickens and pigs, dogs and jackals."<sup>28</sup>

*Hiri* and its verbal forms (*barāyati*, *hiriyati*, *biriyati*), like the English word shame, can also refer to a nonmoral embarrassment such as one might have about one's physical person in certain circumstances. Intriguingly, one might experience *hiriyā* in offering a *dāna*, suggesting a sense of modesty or embarrassment in giving a gift out of esteem (*saddhā*) to an admired other.<sup>29</sup> *Hiri* can also include the particular embarrassment one might incur in nudity or in relation to one's bodily functions; in the *Atthasālinī* Buddhaghosa says that when a son of a good family while answering the calls of nature sees someone before whom he is rightly ashamed, he is disgraced and should become embarrassed.<sup>30</sup> Here quite acutely one sees oneself through the eyes of another. *Hiri* is thus connected with the particular modesty or shame associated with nakedness. In discussing the allotted robes for a monk, Buddhaghosa describes the loincloth and its purpose, which is to conceal the private parts: "For whenever the body is revealed, *hiri* is disturbed, damaged; thus it is called private parts (*birikopina*) because of the disturbance of shame (*birikopanto*)."<sup>31</sup> Another text that connects shame to nakedness is a jāṭaka story in which an acquisitive monk is chastened by the Buddha for his greediness. In response the monk petulantlly flings off his robe and says "then I'll go around like this." The Buddha restores his sense of shame by recounting a story from the past when that same monk lived as a water sprite in a previous life and for twelve years strived for *hiri* and *otappa*. How is it that he comes to abandon them now? Hearing about his former sense of shame restores it, and the monk covers himself up again.<sup>32</sup>

*Hiri* may also be associated with disgust about one's body, or more specifically, things that come from one's body. In reference to the meditations on the foulness of the body designed to dismantle lust, the *Visuddhimagga* says that when "head hairs, body hairs, nails, teeth, spit, snot, excrement, or urine have fallen out of the body, beings do not want to touch them by hand, are troubled, ashamed (*barāyanti*), and disgusted."<sup>33</sup> Like the concern about contamination with excrement in the iron ball illustration above, this example connects shame with repulsion for excrement.

Given the preceding discussion, I think “shame” may be the best translation for *hiri*. Like *hiri*, shame can be nonmoral and refer to modesty or embarrassment such as at one’s exposed nudity. But also like *hiri*, it can have distinct moral connotations tied up with self-respect. John Rawls, for example, defines shame as “the feeling that someone has when he experiences an injury to his self-respect or suffers a blow to his self-esteem.”<sup>34</sup> Gabriele Taylor also finds a close connection between self-respect and shame that suggests that shame is morally valuable. She sees shame as “the emotion of self-protection” as it provides a “sense of value which protects the self from what in the agent’s own eyes is corruption and ultimately extinction.”<sup>35</sup> This sense of shame as a protection echoes the Pali descriptions of it as a defensive power and as a guardian.

Also evident in certain Western accounts of shame is the role of admired others in fashioning one’s self-assessment. Rawls considers shame to be related in important ways to the virtues or the excellences that one wants to have in oneself, where it greatly matters that one “be esteemed by those with whom he cares to associate.”<sup>36</sup> Finally, some of the Pali references to disgust are also indicated in the Western literature on shame: Martha Nussbaum, who is not inclined to find moral value in what she calls “primitive shame,”<sup>37</sup> sees it as often linked to disgust. For her, both shame and disgust are reactions to things that represent human vulnerability and animality.<sup>38</sup>

In the case of *ottappa* it is more difficult to find a close or ready-made English equivalent. As we have seen, *ottappa* is fear or anguish about doing wrong and the repercussions one will suffer for it. I think that “apprehension” may come closest to naming the experience, because apprehension indicates a foreboding of evil and its effects. In the psychoanalytic literature apprehension is the fear of getting caught,<sup>39</sup> which registers the fear of consequences and punishment implicit in *ottappa*. The experience as we have it described in the sources is quite intense, however, and may be somewhat sharper and more acute than the feeling suggested by the English “apprehension.”

Notably absent in even this initial foray into the Pali vocabulary of shame and self-consciousness is any language corresponding

exactly with the concept of guilt,<sup>40</sup> defined as an internally generated anguish of having committed a wrong. To be sure, *hiri*, as we have seen, is described as internally generated (in that it is motivated by self-respect), but even this experience is a matter of internalizing and wanting to realize in oneself certain social norms and values developed through seeing oneself through the gaze of another. Moreover, the Pali treatment of *hiri* and *ottappa* emphasizes not feelings of anguish after committing a wrong deed or omitting a good one, but of anticipating feelings that check wrong deeds before they may occur. Their value lies in what they keep us from doing, not in writhed anguish when reflecting on wrongs already committed.

Shame and apprehension are not the same as regret and remorse, which may cover some of the same ground as the experience of guilt. In fact, regret and remorse are mental states about which the Pali sources are quite ambivalent. On the one hand, remorse seems to have some positive value in teaching the nature of cause and effect and the future karmic retributions awaiting the evildoer. We can identify a certain cautionary value in deathbed remorse in descriptions of the anguish of one who is lapsing, where “one swoons, his thirst and fever increase, and the suffering of remorse (*amūḍhā*) crushes him thoroughly.”<sup>41</sup> Similarly, the *Petavatthu* describes the remorse (*vippaṭṭisāra*) of ghosts who realize their wrong deeds and their consequences.<sup>42</sup> In the context of the Vinaya, remorse (*vippaṭṭisāra*) may be appropriate when those in violation of the monastic code are reproved.<sup>43</sup>

Yet the Pali sources do not exalt bad conscience as a moral value in and of itself. In fact, remorse is more often seen as a hindrance to religious and moral progress. Another term for remorse or regret is *kukkuca*, worry or fidgeting, which rarely can indicate a valuable sense of scruple<sup>44</sup> but usually is listed, paired with agitation or conceit (*uddhacca*), as among the five “hindrances” (*nīvarana*) that shackle one’s religious advancement (the others are sensual desire, ill will, sloth and torpor, and doubt). These hindrances are “makers of blindness, causing lack of vision, lack of knowledge, detrimental to wisdom, tending to vexation, leading away from liberation.”<sup>45</sup> Generally, being assailed with worry and remorse is an unproductive state, distracting

and debilitating. The word *kukkucca* is associated with a problematic overscrupulousness, where one finds faults in faultless actions or trifles, or has an excessive preoccupation with minor aspects of rule.<sup>46</sup> The *Atthasālinī* says that "since one cannot undo a bad deed nor do a good deed that was neglected, returning again [to it] in remorse is ugly"; moreover, "remorse scratches the mind like the point of an awl on a metal bowl."<sup>47</sup> This same text then goes on to say that scruples in the context of the Vinaya rules are not hindrances in this sense, though to be sure, an arhat is one who is not troubled by remorse or worry about evil deeds he has done in the past.<sup>48</sup>

In contrast, *hiri* and *ottappa* are morally valuable because they keep one from experiencing the pangs of remorse. An extended discussion of a monk lacking *hiri* and *ottappa* and the other powers likens him to a person in poverty who comes to be indebted, pressed by his debtors, and tracked by them.

Now that poor miserable wretch lacking faith, *hiri*, *ottappa*, energy, and insight into wholesome things commits evil with body, speech, and mind. I call that his getting into debt. Then, in an effort to cover his wicked physical deeds he generates a wicked hope: he wishes, "may none know me," he resolves, "may none know me," he says verbally, "may none know me," and he exerts himself physically that "may none know me." So, too, with regard to his wicked verbal deeds and his wicked mental deeds. I call that the interest [on his debt]. Then well-behaved monastics say thus, "This venerable one is one whose deeds are such, whose conduct is such." I call that his being reproved. So he goes to a forest, or to the root of a tree, or to a lonely spot, but remorse accompanies him, and wicked, unwholesome thoughts assail him. I call that his being followed.<sup>49</sup>

Here lack of shame and apprehension lead him to wrong action and hiding his actions, which compound the wrong. The repeated refrain "may none know me" gives clue to his desperation, and to the extreme desire not to be known or seen by others, which is,

interestingly, a "wicked hope." Then follows the inevitable exposure to and disapproval of his fellows and, finally, remorse and loneliness. As a poor man cannot escape his debtors, so too a wicked man cannot outrun his remorse. This image of being dogged by remorse even as one seeks to run into the woods is an evocative image of the loneliness of this condition. There is nothing so harsh and dreadful nor a greater bar to achieving highest peace than this state.<sup>50</sup> The text treats him with tender pity but offers little future hope.

The English word *remorse* has the sense of "emotional gnawing at oneself over one's wrongdoing" and "etymologically, it means 'to bite again,' suggesting continual reopening of wounds as one rehearses again and again a vivid appreciation of one's wrongdoing."<sup>51</sup> Clearly this sort of bad conscience is a distraction from peace of mind and is the very condition a well-established sense of shame and apprehension can prevent.

Not assigning much moral value to guilt or remorse, there is little need for ritual techniques or formal procedures to eliminate them, at least in the texts. We find few instances of confession or ritual attempts to make retribution, though they are not entirely unknown.<sup>52</sup> Instead we find much more interest in the internal elements of moral psychology and eliminating the roots of wrongdoing than in external acts of reparations.

Recent Western philosophical treatments of shame are quite ambivalent about its moral value, in part because much of the discussion on it has evolved around the dichotomy of shame and guilt. A distinction between "shame cultures" and "guilt cultures" that emerged in the mid-twentieth century brought an enterprise of cultural generalization to the discussion in ways that have left an enduring and much-critiqued legacy.<sup>53</sup> Guilt cultures are thought to be more advanced than shame cultures because they rely on an internal sense of conscience that rests on convictions about moral laws, responsibilities, and obligations, while shame cultures are alleged to invoke a fear of the judgment of others and losing face before them. Since Benedict's writing, scholars from several directions have challenged both the notion of depicting and polarizing entire cultures on the basis of



these two constructs (finding guilt and shame present across cultures more widely than Benedict allows), as well as the nature of Benedict's descriptions of the experiences of guilt and shame. A chief source of confusion is the distinction between guilt as internally generated and shame merely as the result of external sanctions; a distinction that does not survive closer examination of Western types of shame<sup>54</sup> or this account of Pāli *hiri*.

More interesting is the emergence in more recent studies of a gulf separating those who find moral and social value in shame and those who, in contrast, find shame morally crippling. Again, these discussions have proceeded along the lines of distinguishing shame and guilt, yet they forge perhaps a more-promising distinction that sees shame as involving a global self-evaluation in contrast to guilt, which involves pain about a specific action or omission. Where guilt is a matter of feeling anguish about the consequences of an action or its victim, shame calls into question one's whole self. Guilt looks to the wrong committed or its victim, while "shame looks to what I am."<sup>55</sup>

Those who find moral value in shame are impressed with shame's ability to affirm and express one's deepest values. According to Aaron Ben-Ze'ev, "the importance of shame to moral behavior indicates the double moral aspect of shame: shame indicates that we violated a certain profound norm, and in this sense we are morally bad, but it also expresses the fact that we care about this norm and this caring is commendable from a moral point a view."<sup>56</sup> Even though painful, shame is, according to this line of thinking, morally valuable because it involves self-reflection, scruples, and standards of rightness to which the individual holds him or herself.<sup>57</sup> That shame may be valuable in this way is suggested by our sense that shameless people are morally reprehensible. For those who find moral promise in shame, it is this reflection on the whole self that is potentially of ethical relevance, for it suggests a valuable self-consciousness. Taylor suggests that shame "requires a sophisticated type of self-awareness":

A person feeling shame will exercise her capacity for self-awareness, and she will do so dramatically: from being just an actor absorbed in what she is doing she will suddenly become self-aware and self-critical. It is plainly a state of

self-consciousness which centrally relies on the concept of another, for the thought of being seen as one might be seen by another is the catalyst for the emotion.<sup>58</sup>

There are striking parallels here with descriptions of *hiri* that suggest the importance of the "seeing eye" in one's self-appraisal and the complex subjectivity or self-awareness this makes possible. Moreover in shame this awareness "of who and of what one hopes to be" is delivered through the emotions,<sup>59</sup> providing an immediacy and impact that perhaps only feelings can give.

Shame also has its detractors. Even some pro-shame scholars admit that there can emerge a sense of helplessness and paralysis in certain types of shame. While shame may testify to a keen sense of self-consciousness, it might not automatically stimulate moral regeneration. Its disappointing evaluation of one's very being and identity suggests that it is a "global attack on the self," a highly negative and painful state that can be extremely difficult to dissipate.<sup>60</sup> John Kekes finds shame to be a feeling of deficiency that is so self-demeaning as to be destructive; far from entailing self-respect, it is in fact the loss of self-respect.<sup>61</sup> Stanley Cavell considers shame to be "arbitrary, inflexible and extreme in its effect," the most primitive of emotions and social responses, often bringing "rage and folly in its train."<sup>62</sup> Clinical and developmental psychologists June Price Tangney and Ronda Dearing are led by their evidence to favor the moral value of guilt over shame, suggesting that shame has a very negative impact on interpersonal behavior.<sup>63</sup> Guilt can lead to confession and restitution for the action or omission that produced it, while shame cannot or need not show the way to reparation and renewal.

Where I think the Pāli analysis of *hiri* and *ottappa* can intervene in these discussions is that in the Pāli framework, these emotions are morally valuable for what they offer at the moment of moral decision-making rather than after the deed is committed. Shame and apprehension are valuable in that they *prevent* shameful acts, an aspect of shame that has gone largely overlooked in these discussions<sup>64</sup> and may continue to be invisible as long as shame is paired with guilt (which always concerns the past). *Hiri* and *ottappa* describe a complex moral imagination that is not merely reactive but which can anticipate

the effect of one's actions on others, and perhaps equally importantly, on oneself. They are beautiful and wholesome mental states (in the Abhidhamma sense) because where they are present, immoral actions are simply impossible. Rather than past-oriented emotions akin to remorse and regret, they are future-oriented states that deploy complex operations of self-appraisal that protect us even as they protect the world.

Another place in which *hiri* and *ottappa* can contribute to current work on shame is that they lend support to critiques that challenge the presumed moral superiority of "internality" (the ability to make moral decisions independently of social norms) over external, social motivations. While shame fosters a new self-awareness, it does so by introducing outside perspectives in ways that can decenter the self. Jane Geaney suggests that "internality may signify moral autonomy, but if the price of moral autonomy is moral motivation that stems from excessive self-focus, then being able to feel moral emotions in solitude is not necessarily to one's credit."<sup>56</sup> Shame entails internalizing the authority of the other, requiring of us to consider and give way—emotionally—to the claims of social norms and values. By installing in one's inner life the voice or gaze of an imagined admired other, our autonomy may be compromised. However, in this very compromise of autonomy we can find "intimations of a genuine social reality—in particular, of how it will be for one's life with others if one acts in one way rather than another"<sup>56</sup> that must be the very stuff of a moral life.

It is important to note that shame in the Pāli sources does not imply mere conformity to social norms as they stand. While the examples given depict sensitivity to one's station, class, and age, they also train a steady eye on one's teacher, one's fellows in the religious life, and the Buddha and the *sangha* as idealized others. One's autonomy is compromised not in deference to the unreflective rabble but to an emerging awareness of the values of those one admires and how one stands in relation to them. This awareness may in fact provide new avenues of self-determination. *Hiri* and *ottappa* suggest that being emotionally attuned to admired people is a key resource for developing moral agency. They also suggest that the moral and religious life is not a solitary quest. In a *festschrift*—in which we pause to reflect on the

importance of teachers such as Professor Karunatilake in our lives—we can appreciate quite pointedly the tremendous moral significance Buddhist thought assigns to the teacher.

The pairing of shame and apprehension is another area where the Pāli ideas can reconfigure the questions asked about shame in other contexts. In the Pāli sources apprehension, a particular type of fear, is a valuable moral experience. The assigning of moral value to fear is somewhat surprising given the negative associations of fear elsewhere in Buddhist thought and the neglect of apprehension as a plausible moral sentiment in recent secular Western thought.<sup>57</sup> The ability to anticipate the effects of one's actions, to imagine their grave consequences, and then to recoil from wrongdoing is, these discussions of *ottappa* tell us, part of a rich emotional life that can provide guidance in moral decision-making. Apprehension is not a "lower motive" for desisting from evil. The texts do not suggest that shame is superior to apprehension but merely that people may be motivated by either, and that both are strengths, protections, and bright states. Like shame, apprehension undermines our sense of autonomy by reminding us that we are vulnerable in the face of our own evil. Yet, in this Buddhist view, such fear can be a great safeguard and protection, a source of agency that refuses to allow our moral vulnerability to be exploited.

## NOTES

- 1 Pe Maung Tin translates *hiri* as "conscientiousness" and *ottappa* as "fear of blame" (*The Expositor* [London: The Pali Text Society, 1976], 164–67); Peter Harvey prefers "self respect" for *hiri* and "regard for consequences" for *ottappa* (*An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000], 11); Nāṇamoli renders *hiri* by "conscience" and *ottappa* by "shame" (*The Path of Purification* [Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1991], 467); and Nyanaponika Thera translates *hiri* as "moral shame" and *ottappa* as "moral dread" (*Abhidhamma Studies* [Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1998]). The Sanskrit equivalents are *hiri* and *apatrāpya* in the *Abhidharmakośa*, which La Vallée Poussin translates as "le respect" and "la crainte" respectively (*L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu* [Brussels: Institut Belge des Hautes Études Chinoises, 1971], vol. 1: 156,

- 172); Monier-Williams gives for *bri* "shame, modesty, shyness, timidity" and for *apa-trap*: "to be ashamed or bashful, to turn away the face" (*Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, [New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1988], 49, 1307).
- 2 *Hiri* is used separately more frequently than *ottappa* such as in the "Hirisutra" (Sn 253), which describes false friends who lack shame; it is also used in a sense related to bodily disgust, as I will describe below.
- 3 *Hirṃā hoti, hirṃyati kāyaduccariteṇa vacīduccariteṇa manoduccariteṇa, hirṃyati pāpakānaṃ akusalanānaṃ* (M I:356); Cf. Pug 23.
- 4 *Ottappi hoti, ottappati kāyaduccariteṇa vacīduccariteṇa manoduccariteṇa, ottappati pāpakānaṃ akusalanānaṃ* (M I:356); Cf. Pug 23.
- 5 *Kāyaduccarīṇābhi hiriyati hiri. Lajjīyetaṃ abhivacanaṃ. Tebyeva ottappati ottappaṃ. Pāpato ubbegasseṇa abhivacanaṃ. Taṭṭha pāpato jigucchanaḍakkhaṇā hiri. Uttasanaḍakkhaṇaṃ ottappaṃ. Lajjīkareṇa pāṇānaṃ akaraṇasā hiri. Uttīkāreṇa ottappaṃ. Vattappakāreṇeva ca pāpato saṅkocanapaccapaṭṭhānā eṇi, attagānaṃparagūṇāvapadaṭṭhānā. Attānaṃ gaṇṇaṃ katvā hiriyā pāṇaṃ jābhāti kuluvadhū vija. Paraṃ gaṇṇaṃ katvā ottappaṇa pāṇaṃ jābhāti vesiyā vija. Ime ca paṇa dve dhammā lokapālakāti dattibhābā* (Vism 464–65; cf. DhSA 124–25).
- 6 *Hiri pāṇadhamaṇe gūṭhayaṃ vija passanti jigucchanti āha "pāpato jigucchanaḍakkhaṇā hiri" ti. Ottappaṃ te uṇṭhayaṃ vija passantaṃ tato uttasanti suttaṃ "uttīśalakkhaṇaṃ ottappaṃ" ti* (Visuddhimagga-Mahāṅkā 2, 143).
- 7 *Na paṇeṇaṃ kadāci aññamañāvuripyogā. Na bi lajjānaṃ nibbhayaṃ, pāṇabhayaṃ vā alajjānaṃ arthāti* (Visuddhimagga-Mahāṅkā 2, 143). Bernard Williams also sees, and attributes to the Greeks, an element of fear in shame (Bernard Williams, *Shame and Necessity*. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993], 79), and Gerhart Piers contends that in shame stands fear of contempt and abandonment (Gerhart Piers and Milton Singer, *Shame and Guilt: A Psychoanalytic and a Cultural Study* [Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1953], 16).

- 8 *Hirottappe bi sati silaṃ uppaṅgati c'eva tiṭṭhanti ca; asati n'eva uppaṅgati na tiṭṭhanti* (Vism 8).
- 9 Bhikkhu Bodhi, *A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma* (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1993), 85. The use of the term *beautiful* (*sobhana*) here is important: beautiful thoughts, by definition, cannot be evil. In the Abhidhamma it is a wider category than *wholesome* (*kusala*) because it includes also thoughts that possess beautiful mental factors but which may be kammically indeterminate (45).
- 10 The seven *balas* are *hiri, ottappa*, and the five faculties (*indriyas*): faith (*saddhā*), vigor (*viriyā*), mindfulness (*sati*), concentration (*saṃādhī*), and wisdom (*paññā*). Nyanaponika says that *hiri* and *ottappa* are not considered *indriyas* because their function is purely "defensive" (Nyanaponika, *Abhidhamma Studies*, 31–33 and 63–66; also D III:229). There are also five powers of a learner (*sekkhābala*): *saddhā, hiri, ottappa, viriyā, and paññā*, listed in A III:1. They are also listed among the seven "treasures" (*dhana*): faith, morality, *hiri, ottappa*, learning, renunciation, and wisdom (D III:252).
- 11 Nyanaponika, *Abhidhamma Studies*, 65.
- 12 *Idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu assaddho hoti, ahiriko hoti, anottappā hoti, kusāto hoti, duppaṇṇo hoti. Imehi kho, bhikkhave, pañcāhi dhammehi samannāgato bhikkhu diṭṭheva dhamme dukkhaṃ vīharati saṃgāhānaṃ sa-upāyāsaṃ saparilāhaṃ, kāyassa ca bhedā paraṃ maraṇā duggati pātikāṅkha... Idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu saddho hoti, hirimaṃ hoti, ottappi hoti, āraddiviriyō hoti, paññāvū hoti. Imehi kho, bhikkhave, pañcāhi dhammehi samannāgato bhikkhu diṭṭheva dhamme sukkhaṃ vīharati avighātaṃ anupāyāsaṃ aparilāhaṃ, kāyassa ca bhedā paraṃ maraṇā sugati pātikāṅkha* (A III:3).
- 13 *Hirottappe, bhikkhave, asati hirottappavipannaṃsa battipaniṇo hoti indriyasamvara* (A IV:99).
- 14 *Pāpakarāṇatā eṭaṃ na jāti-sampannānaṃ kammaṃ, bhāva-jaccānaṃ kevaṭṭakāḍhināṃ idaṃ kammaṃ, tādisassa jāti-sampannaṃsa idaṃ kammaṃ kāṭṭhena yuttanta. Evaṃ tāva jātiṃ paccavekkhivipānātipātādi-pāpamkaronto bhimsamuṭṭhāpeti. Taṭṭhā pāpa karaṇaṃ nāmi eṭaṃ dabharehi kaṭabbāmi kammaṃ, tādisassa vayasampannaṃsa idaṃ kammaṃ kāṭṭhena yuttanta*

- ti. *Evam vuyam paccavekkhivā pāṇātipāḍādi-pāpam akaronṭo bhirim sammūḥhāpeti. Taṭṭhā pāpa-karāṇam nāmi' etam dubbhala-jāṭkāṇam kammam, tādisassa sīrabbhāva-sampammassa idam kammam kāmim na yuttam ti. Evam sīrabbhāvum paccavekkhivā pāṇātipāḍādi-pāpam akaronṭo bhirim sammūḥhāpeti. Taṭṭhā pāpa-karāṇam nāmi' etam andha-bālāṇam kammam na paṇḍitāṇam, tādisassa paṇḍitassa bahussutassa idam kammam kāmim na yuttam ti. Evam bāhusaccam paccavekkhivā pāṇātipāḍādi-pāpamakaronṭo bhirim sammūḥhāpeti (DhsA 125).*
- 15 *Ekacco hi jāṭinubhatta - paccavekkhaṇā sattiṇubhatta - paccavekkhaṇā dāyajjā - mahatta - paccavekkhaṇā sabrahmacāra-mahatta-paccavekkhaṇā ti catūhi karaṇehi sappāṭissavulakkhaṇam bhirim sammūḥhāpetvā pāpam na karoti (DhsA 127).*
- 16 *Sace vaṃ pāpa-kammam karissasi catūsū parisāsu garabhappatto bhavussasi.*
- Garabhissanti tam viññū asuṇim nāgariko yathā Vajjito silavantehi kaḥam bhikkhu karissasi ti (DhsA 125).*
- 17 *Kaḥam lokādhīpati ottappam nāma? Ithi' ekacco kulaputto lokam adhipatiṭṭhakam katvā pāpakaṃ kammam na karoti:— Yathāba: Mabhā kḥo pama loka-sammivāso, mahantasmim kḥo pama loka-sammivāse santi samāna-brāhmaṇā iddhimānto ḍhba-cakkhikā paracitta-viduro, te dīvato pi passanti āsannā pi na dīssanti cetasā pi cittam pajāṇanti, te pi maṃ evam jāṇissanti: passathā bhō imam kulaputtam, saddhaya agārasmā anagāriyam pabbajīto samāno vokiṇṇo vīharati pāpakehi akusalehi dhammehi ti (DhsA 126).*
- 18 Williams, *Shame and Necessity*, 89. However, see Jane Geaney for the lack of visibility and fear of being seen in Confucian models of shame (“Guarding Moral Boundaries: Shame in Early Confucianism,” *Philosophy East and West* 54.2 [2004]: 113).
- 19 Williams, *Shame and Necessity*, 82.
- 20 Karen Derris offers a very insightful exploration of the gaze of oneself and the gaze of another in moral agency and subjectivity in Theravāda ethics, although in ways not directly linked to shame (Karen Derris, “Virtue and Relationships in a Theravādin Biography of the Bodhisatta: A Study of the *Sattābhakimāhānidāna*” [Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2000], 195–205).

- 21 *Vitikkamīnabbavattihussanāyoge c'assa sammukhā saṅgḥam passato vya bhoṭṭappam paccupāḥhāti (Vism 221).*
- 22 S V:89.
- 23 *Te kassapa, evam sikkhiḥham tibbam me bhoṭṭappam paccupāḥhītam bhavissati tḥeresu naveṇu majjhimesi ti (S II:220).*
- 24 *Bhikkhusarīhāram nparissāya vīharati aññātaram vā garuḥhīmyam sabrahmacārim yathassa tibbam bhoṭṭappampaccupāḥhītam hoi pemañca gāraṇo ca (D III:284).*
- 25 *Ekam antam nisino kḥo āyasmā ānando bhagavanam etadavoca “upādham idam, bhante, brahmacariyam, yad idam— kalyāṇamīratā kalyāṇasabhāyātā kalyāṇasampavāpātā” ti. “Mā hevam, ānanda, mā hevam, ānanda! Sakalamvīdam, ānanda, brahmacariyam, yad idam kalyāṇamīratā kalyāṇasabhāyātā kalyāṇasampavāpātā” (S V:2).*
- 26 *Yathā dūsū ayogulesu eko sīlalo bhaveya gūḥamakkhito eko uḥho ādīto, tattha paṇḍīto sīlalam gūḥamakkhītatā jigucchanto na gaṇhāti, iaram dāḥa-bhaya. Tattha sīlakaṣṇā gūḥa-makkhaṇa-jigucchāya agāḥanam vya ajjhattam lajjitābbam dhammam okkamivā vā pāpassa akaraṇam, uḥhassa dāḥa-bhaya agāḥanam vya apāya-bhaya paḥassa akaraṇam vedītābbam (DhsA 126–27).*
- 27 Nyanaponika, *Abhidhamma Studies*, 33, 70–71; Vism 465; A I:51.
- 28 *Dveṇe bhikkhāve, dhammā sukkā lokam pāḥenti. Katame dve? Hiri ca ottappañca. Ime kḥo, bhikkhāve, dve sukkā dhammā lokam na pāḥeyum, nayiḥha paṇṇāyetha mātāti vā mānucchāti vā māṭulānāti vā ācariyabhariyāti vā garuṇam darātī vā. Sambhedam loko agamissa, yathā ajeḥakā kukkutasūkarā soṇasīgālā. Yasma ca kḥo, bhikkhāve, ime dve sukkā dhammā lokam pāḥenti tasma paṇṇāyati (A I:51; DhsA 129–30); see also Iti 42.*
- 29 *Saddhā bhiriyam kusalañca dānam / dhammā eṇe sappurisaṇuyātā (A IV:236).*
- 30 *Ekacco hi yathā nāma eko kulaputto uccāra-passivādīni karonto lajjitābbayuttam ekam dīsū vā lajjanākarāppatto bhaveya hiḥito (DhsA 124).*

- 31 *Hirikopīna ti tan tan sambhāḥḥāṇam. Yamin yamin bi aṅge utiryamane biri kuppai vinassati, tan tan hirikopānato hirikopīna ti uccati* (Vism 31); see also M I:10, which also explains the etymology of *hirikopīna*. Cf. Williams: "the word *aidōia*, a derivative of *aidōs*, 'shame,' is a standard Greek word for the generals, and similar terms are found in other languages" (Williams, *Shame and Necessity*, 78); see also Piers on German Scham, which suggests sexuality and nudity, and Freud's association of the term with loathing (Piers and Singer, *Shame and Guilt*, 7–8).
- 32 J I:127; this is the Devadhamma Jātaka; see also DHA III:73.
- 33 *Tabhā bi keva lomā-nakha-danta-khela-siṅghāṅhika-uccāra-passāvāḍisekekakolhāsam pi sarivato bābi patīan satā batthena dhupīnaṃ pi na ucchānti, aḷiyanti, harāyanti, jigucchānti* (Vism 195).
- 34 John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 442; see also Aaron Ben-Ze'ev, *The Subtlety of Emotions* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), 527.
- 35 Gabriele Taylor, *Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 80–81.
- 36 Rawls, *Theory of Justice*, 444–45.
- 37 Nussbaum argues that shame is complex and there are many different types of it, some of which can be morally constructive. But her chief interest is "primitive shame" which is "the demand for perfection and the consequent inability to tolerate any lack of control or imperfection," a feeling closely connected to infantile narcissism and one that she regards as a "danger to the moral and social life" (Nussbaum, *Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law* [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004], 192).
- 38 Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 347.
- 39 Piers and Singer, *Shame and Guilt*, 5.
- 40 It may be helpful to distinguish the layers of meaning in the word *guilt*. External guilt, that is, guilt in the sense of being culpable in a legal or quasi-legal sense for a transgression, is evident in the term *aparāḥha* "sin, fault, offence, guilt" (T.

- W. Rhys Davids and William Scede, *Pāli-English Dictionary*, [London: Pāli Text Society, 1921–25], 52). For the internal sense of guilt we find no Pāli equivalent. Gananaath Obeyesekere brings a Freudian analysis to guilt, distinguishing between primary guilt, which concerns deep unconscious feelings lodged in the psyche, and secondary or social guilt, which is the feeling of having committed a wrong. In analyzing his data, the fact that no word for guilt occurs in the Sinhala language of his informants (or in indeed most languages) does not trouble him, as he suspects that, unlike shame which is a social emotion and thus widely present in social communication, guilt is a personal, psychoanalytic category rooted in prelinguistic unconscious experience (Gananaath Obeyesekere, *Meditasa's Hair* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981], 79–80).
- 41 *Saddhammopāyana* 288; Translated by A. A. Hazlewood, *Journal of the Pāli Text Society* 12 (1988): 106.
- 42 PvA 14, 60, 105.
- 43 Vin II:250.
- 44 DhA IV:88.
- 45 *Pāncine, bhikkhave, nivarāṇā andhakaraṇā acakkhukaraṇā aññākarāṇā paṇṇā nirōdhikā vighārapakkhbyā añbhāsarāṇavuttānikā* (S V:97).
- 46 DhSA 383.
- 47 *Yasmā pana so katam vā pāpaṃ akatam na karoti akatam va katvānaṃ katam na karoti tasamā virūpa kucchito vā patissāro ti vippatissāro...uppajjānaṇam pana kukkucam āraggam ima kamsapattam manam uttishānaṇam eva uppajjati* (DhSA 384).
- 48 DhSA 384. There may be an important distinction between Vinaya and Abhidhamma treatment of *kukkucā*. Nārada Mahā Thera says this: "According to Vinaya, *kukkucā* is healthy doubt with regard to rules and is commended. According to Abhidhamma, on the contrary, it is repentance which is not commended" (Nārada Mahā Thera, *A Manual of Abhidhamma* [Kuala Lumpur: Buddhist Missionary Society 1979], 99); see also Caroline Rhys Davids on this matter with reference to this passage (*A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics* [London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1900], 312–13).

- 49 Sa kbo so, bhikkhave, dāhiddo assako anāhiko saddhāya asati kusalesu dhammesu, biriyā asati kusalesu dhammesu, oṭṭape asati kusalesu dhammesu, viriye asati kusalesu dhammesu, paññāya asati kusalesu dhammesu, kāyena duccharitāṃ carati, vācāya duccharitāṃ carati, manasā duccharitāṃ carati. Idam assa ipādānamīṃ vaddāmi. So tassa kāyaduccharitassa paticchādanabhetu pāpikam iccham paṇḍabatti, mā man jaññū ti icchati, mā man jaññū ti saṅkappati mā man jaññū ti vācam bhāsati, mā man jaññū ti kayena parakkamati. So tassa vācīduccharitassa paticchādanabhetu...pe...so tassa manoduccharitassa paticchādanabhetu...pe...mā man jaññū ti kāyena parakkamati. Idam assa vaddhīyā vaddāmi. Tamenam pesālasabrahmacārī evamāhamsu—āyaṃ ca so āyasmā evaṃkāri evaṃsamācāro ti. Idam assa codanāya vaddāmi. Tamenam araṇṇagatāṃ vā rukkhamaḷagatāṃ vā suññāgāragatāṃ vā vipṭisārāsahagatā pāpākā akusalaviriakkā samudācaranti. Idam assa anucariyāya vaddāmi (A III:352–53).
- 50 Nāham, bhikkhave, aññam ekabandhanampi samanupassāmi evamānāṃ evaṃkātukam, evamanarāyākavam anutarassa jogakkhemassa adbigamāya, yathayidam (A III:353).
- 51 Claudia Falconer Card, "Rectification and Reminders," in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. E. Craig (London: Routledge, 1998), 1.
- 52 The Vinaya Patimokkha rules prescribe confession as a means of laying bare one's transgressions and thus reintegrating with the community; there is also the important case of Ajātasattu's "confession" of his patricide (D I:86; DA I:236). However, it seems that confession does not, as J. Duncan M. Derrett points out, involve forgiveness or absolution and in his view is a "secondary expedient" invoked when "the Buddha's insistence on self-monitoring and self-purification seems to have broken down" (J. Duncan M. Derrett, "Confession in Early Buddhism," in *Buddhaviidhyāsūbhākarah: Studies in Honour of Heinz Becher on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday*, ed. Petra Kieffer Pulz and Jens-Uwe Hartmann [Göttingen: Swistral-Ondorf, 1997], 55, 57).
- 53 See Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946).

- 54 See Piers and Singer, *Shame and Guilt*, 48–53. This discussion traces the distinction between guilt and shame cultures to Margaret Mead. See also Williams, *Shame and Necessity*, 81, where he suggests that the notion that reactions of shame depend simply upon being found out is "a silly mistake."
- 55 Williams, *Shame and Necessity*, 93.
- 56 Ben-Ze'ev, *Subtlety of Emotions*, 528.
- 57 See also Arnold Isenberg, "Natural Pride and Natural Shame," in *Explaining Emotions*, ed. by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 374–75.
- 58 Taylor, *Pride, Shame, and Guilt*, 67.
- 59 Williams, *Shame and Necessity*, 102.
- 60 Michael Lewis, "Self-Conscious Emotions: Embarrassment, Pride, Shame, and Guilt," in *Handbook of Emotions*, ed. Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones (New York: Guilford Press, 2000), 629.
- 61 John Keke, "Shame and Moral Progress," in *Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue*, ed. Peter A. French et al. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 282, 286.
- 62 Stanley Cavell, "The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear," in *Must We Mean What We Say?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 286–87.
- 63 June Price Tangney and Ronda L. Dearing, *Shame and Guilt* (New York: Guilford Press, 2002), 3.
- 64 With the exception of Ben-Ze'ev: "a preventative type of morality would be, therefore, to educate people to realize their value as human beings and hence to enhance their self-respect; in this case, shame is likely to emerge when immoral deeds are even merely contemplated" (*The Subtlety of Emotions*, 528).
- 65 Jane Geaney, "Guarding Moral Boundaries: Shame in Early Confucianism," *Philosophy East and West* 54.2 (2004): 116.
- 66 Williams, *Shame and Necessity*, 102.
- 67 The British moral sense theorists and those influenced by them may offer an important exception to this neglect of fear or

apprehension, though even they offer little systematic reflection on it. Adam Smith was aware of the “dread of blame,” where one “dreads not only to be hated, but to be hateful...not only blame, but blame-worthiness” (*The Theory of Moral Sentiments* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976], 113–14). Shaftesbury observes: “Nor does the fear of hell or a thousand terrors of the Deity imply conscience, unless where there is an apprehension of what is wrong, odious, morally deformed, and ill-deserving. And where this is the case, there conscience must have effect, and punishment of necessity be apprehended, even though it be not expressly threatened.” Moreover, he goes on to say, “no creature can maliciously and intentionally do ill without being sensible at the same time that he deserves ill...and thus suspicions and ill apprehensions must arise, with terrors both of men and the Deity” (Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999], 209). Further comparative engagement of Buddhist moral psychology and the British moral sense theorists suggests a fruitful avenue for future study.